Edmund Phelps (1994) introduced a modi…ed Phillips curve where the natural rate of unemployment is a function of the real interest rate instead of a constant. This proposition usually works well in normal times but is likely to break down during a balance sheet recession ( Koo, 2010) such as the ones recently seen in many countries. In the late eighties, after having deregulated credit and capital movements, Finland experienced a housing boom which subsequently developed into a serious economic crisis similar to the recent ones. To learn from the Finnish experience we estimate the Phelps modi…ed Phillips curve and use a Smooth Transition (STR) model to distinguish between normal and nonnormal periods.
Introduction
The present …nancial crisis, triggered o¤ in 2007 by a housing boom in the USA, quickly developed into a serious economic crisis and then into an even more devastating debt crisis. The mere scope of the crisis has shaken the foundations of the world economy and has started a debate about the realism of standard economic models as they were not able to foresee the problems ahead (see eg. Colander et al. 2008) . Obviously such models lack features that otherwise could have warned us about the approaching disaster and possibly prevented it. These de…ciencies may render them unable to provide the necessary policy guidelines for dealing with the still ongoing crises. The question we raise in this paper is whether there are useful lessons to be learnt by studying the dynamics of a previous real estate bubble.
While Japan in the mid-nineties is the most well-known case of a house bubble to be followed by a long balance sheet recession, Finland also went through a similar crisis a few years before the Japanese one. Deregulation of the Finnish credit market in 1986 resulted in a booming house market and the build-up of a serious house price bubble. When the bubble burst in 1990 house prices collapsed (see Figure 1 , panel a) and unemployment rose rapidly from a low 2% to almost 20% (see panel b). These are huge ‡uctuations which beg the question whether the scope for macroeconomic policy changed when Finland entered a balance sheet recession and if so, how?
In a recent book Koo (2010) argues that the interest rate is likely to become impotent as an instrument for monetary policy during a balance sheet recession. This is because private …rms and individuals are forced to spend any gains from lower interest rates on deleveraging rather than on investment and consumption. In such a situation, low interest rates are not likely to lead to a boom in economic activity and, hence, in ‡ationary pressure. Thus, when the economy moves into a balance sheet recession, one would expect the relationship between interest rates and the unemployment rate to change.
The structural slumps theory in Phelps (1994) predicts that the natural rate of unemployment is a function of the real interest rate and, hence, provides a rationale for why the two should be related. However, in Phelps theory the natural rate is a function of a stationary real interest rate (a consequence of the rational expectations hypothesis). Econometrically this is di¢ cult to reconcile with the empirical …nding that real interest rates typically exhibit long persistent swings which are di¢ cult to distinguish from a unit root process.
Based on the theory of Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE), Frydman and Goldberg (2007) show that such persistent swings in real interest rates are likely to be associated with speculative behavior in …nancial markets 1 . Juselius (2012) argues that IKE combined with Phelps Structural Slumps theory can give the rationale for why the nominal interest rate exhibit much more persistence than the in ‡ation rate and, hence, why the ex post real interest rates often move in a nonstationary manner.
Thus, an econometric analysis based on cointegration techniques seems to be relevant for learning about the relationship between in ‡ation, unemployment and interest rates. properties of the Phelps Phillips curve. But, as argued by Koo (2010) we should also expect to see a change in these properties when the economy enters a balance sheet recession. To test this possibility we apply the Smooth Transition (STR) model suggested by Teräsvirta (1994) and others to study the cointegration properties of the Phillips curve for Finnish data and how they might have changed after the bubble burst in 1990:1.
The natural rate of unemployment and the Phillips curve
The Phillip's curve was historically established as an empirical regularity that seemed to work well in the …fties and the sixties. The relationship predicts that in ‡ation would be negatively associated with the deviation of unemployment from a constant natural rate. But then the in the seventies stag ‡ation replaced the standard Phillips curve with in ‡ation and unemployment rates positively co-moving. This break-down of the previously accepted empirical regularity seemed to be caused by the increasingly important role of in ‡a-tionary expectations. As a result, the expectations'augmented Phillips curve became the new standard. But, starting from the eighties in ‡ation rate kept steadily declining whereas unemployment continued to exhibit long persistent swings. In particular many European countries experienced this kind of pattern which suggested that the Phillip's curve had again ceased to be empirically relevant. The structural slumps theory, developed by Edmund Phelps in the early nineties, was an impressive attempt to address this problem. The aim was to explain how open economies connected by the world real interest rate (set in a global capital market) and the real exchange rate (determined in a global customers market for tradables) can be hit by long spells of unemployment. According to the structural slumps theory ‡uctuations in the real interest rates and real exchange rates play an important role in explaining the persistent long swings in the observed unemployment rates. The theoretical implication for the Phillips curve was that the natural rate of unemployment, rather than being a constant, became a function of the domestic real interest rate.
The intuition behind the Phelps natural rate with a nonstationary real interest rate is broadly as follows.
When prices of tradable goods are primarily determined in very competitive customer markets, they are not likely to be a¤ected by speculation (energy, precious metals and, recently, grain may be exceptions in this respect) and, therefore, should not exhibit persistent swings around long-run benchmark values. On the other hand, nominal interest rates are likely to be a¤ected by speculation, for example through international capital ‡ows. This implies that the in ‡ation rate will be more stable than the nominal interest rate and, thus, that the real interest rate will inherit the persistent long swings of the latter.
A shock to the long-term interest rate (for example, as a result of an increase in sovereign debt) without a corresponding increase in the in ‡ation rate, is likely to increase the amount of speculative capital moving into the economy. The exchange rate would appreciate, jeopardizing competitiveness in the tradable sector and the trade balance would worsen. The interest rate would start increasing and keep increasing as long as the structural imbalances are growing and we would expect to see the real interest rate and the real exchange rate moving in similar persistent swings. The tendency of the domestic real interest rate to increase and the real exchange rate to appreciate at the same time is likely to aggravate domestic competitiveness in the tradable sector.
In an Imperfect Knowledge Economy the nominal exchange rate is primarily determined by speculation. Therefore, after a permanent shock to relative costs, enterprises cannot in general count on exchange rates to restore competitiveness. Unless they are prepared to loose market shares, they cannot use constant mark-up pricing as their pricing strategy. To preserve market shares, they would have to adjust productivity or pro…ts rather than to increase their product price. This implies that one would expect customer market pricing (Phelps, 1994) or alternatively pricing to market (Krugman, 1993) to replace constant mark-up pricing in an Imperfect Knowledge economy. Hence, pro…ts are squeezed in periods of persistent appreciation and increased in periods of depreciation.
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In such an economy, a customer market …rm, facing an increase in the domestic wage cost in excess of the foreign one, is likely to improve labor productivity rather than to increase product price. Labor productivity can be achieved by new technology or by producing the same output with less labor i.e. by laying o¤ the least productive part of the labor force. In the latter case, the increase in productivity would be achieved at the cost of rising unemployment. Therefore, labor productivity and unemployment is expected to rise in periods of real currency appreciation and increasing real interest rates. Evidence of unemployment co-moving with trend-adjusted productivity and the real interest rate has been found, among others, in Juselius, K. (2006) . Unemployment above or below its time-varying natural rate generally a¤ect nominal wage claims negatively and, hence, price in ‡ation, p: In this set-up, the expectations augmented Phillips Curve:
has a natural rate, u = f (r); which is a function of the real interest rate, r 3 : p e stands for an in ‡ationary expectation. Thus, the structural slumps theory in conjunction with IKE predicts that the unemployment rate and the real interest rates are co-moving both exhibiting similar persistent swings. This means that the unemployment gap u f (r) is likely to be less persistent than unemployment rate itself and that p and (u u ) can be cointegrated even though p and u might seem unrelated. This can explain the general failure to …nd empirical support for the Phillips curve in recent decades.
While the structural slumps mechanism is likely to work well when the major driver underlying the ‡uctuations in aggregate activity is the long swings in real exchange rates, it is less likely to work well in the wake of a fundamental …nancial crises as the present one (Koo, 2010, Miller and Stiglitz, 2010) . This is because when numerous balance sheets in the economy are 'under water', savings will primarily be used for …nancial consolidation rather than for investment and consumption. Not even a zero interest rate may have the intended e¤ect in such a situation as the Japanese experience in the nineties showed. Hence, the Phelps Phillips curve may not be an adequate description of in ‡ation in a balance sheet recession.
Empirical methodology
The idea is to test three di¤erent hypotheses about in ‡ation and unemployment dynamics and compare the results.
1. The same constant parameter CVAR model can approximately describe normal and crisis periods.
2. The main e¤ect of the crisis is a change in the equilibrium mean of the cointegration relations implying that the crisis which erupted in the early nineties caused the natural rate of unemployment to move to a higher level. It involves re-estimating the model with a step-dummy restricted to the cointegration relations.
3. The relationship between interest rates, unemployment and in ‡ation change when the economy moves into a balance sheet recession. This will be tested with a two regime STR model for unemployment and in ‡ation rate.
Speci…cation of CVAR model
We consider the following linear cointegrated VAR model for Finnish quarterly data from 1982:2 to 2010:4:
where, for x 0 t = [ p t ; u t ; rb t ; spr t ], p t is measured as 400( log(CP I) t ); u t as the percentage of the number of unemployed in workforce, rb t = b t p t with b t the annual long-term bond rate, spr t = b t s t is the spread between the long and the short term interest rate as a proxy for in ‡ationary expectations by the market as well as the central bank, Ds 90;t is a step dummy de…ned as Ds 90;t = 1 from 1990:1-2010:4, 0 otherwise, D p;90;t and D p94;t ; are impulse dummies de…ned as 1 in 1990:1 and 1994:2, respectively, 0 otherwise and S t is a vector of three seasonal dummies. Figure 2 , panel (a) shows the general decline in in ‡ation rate from a high 10% annual rate to roughly 2% at the end of the sample, albeit with some ‡uctuations. Panel (b) shows that the unemployment rate rose from a record low of 2.9% in 1990:1 to the record high level of 17.6% only four years later. It illustrates the force with which the crisis struck the Finnish economy. After topping in 1994, it started slowly to come down and reached a new stable level of approximately 6% which, albeit much lower than in the crisis years, was signi…cantly higher than the pre-crisis level. At the outbreak of the recent crisis in 2007, the Finnish unemployment started to rise again. But since Finland had already made the necessary structural adjustments she was fortunate to avoid the worst e¤ects of this crisis. Panel (c) shows that the interest rate spread was systematically negative in the period up to the crisis and systematically positive after the crisis. In the bubble period high in ‡ationary expectations resulted in relatively high short-term interest rates.
Misspeci…cation tests and rank determination
With such dramatic changes over the sample period, it might seem overoptimistic to apply the standard linear VAR model to the data. However, the primary idea of the CVAR analysis is to obtain a …rst order linear approximation of what is considered to be an inherently nonlinear model. A misspeci…cation analysis of the linear CVAR may provide useful insights about the form of the nonlinearities, about the number of cointegration relations and their adjustment dynamics, etc. Such features are often di¢ cult to specify on a priori grounds. In this vein, the subsequent misspeci…cation tests are foremost interpreted as evidence of nonlinearities rather than as a signal for improving the linear speci…cation.
We distinguish between two versions of the model: CVAR 1, de…ned by setting Ds 90;t = 0 and D p;90;t = 0 in (2) and CVAR 2 which corresponds to the full speci…cation. Even though Table 1 shows that CVAR 1 fails on multivariate residual autocorrelation we do not interpret this to mean that more lags should be added but rather that there are non-modelled nonlinear e¤ects in the model. A similar argument applies to the failure of multivariate normality and ARCH. Nevertheless, the signs of misspeci…cation mean that standard distributional results do not hold and the reported signi…cance tests are, therefore, only indicative. Figure 2 showed that the level of unemployment rate was lower in the precrisis period suggesting that the mean of the natural rate in the Phillip's curve may have shifted to a higher level after the crisis erupted. CVAR 2 is speci…ed to account for this possibility by allowing for an equilibrium mean shift in the cointegration relations starting from 1990:1. Table 1 shows that multivariate autocorrelation has improved with this change, but also that multivariate ARCH and normality are still rejected. Based on the univariate tests it appears that normality is primarily a problem because of excess kurtosis in the interest rate spread whereas ARCH is rejected in the interest rate spread and in ‡ation rate equations. Table 2 reports the eigenvalues, i ; and the Bartlett corrected trace tests with p-values in brackets. For CVAR 1, we expect unmodelled nonlinearities to produce additional persistence in the model that may make the trace test less reliable. This can probably explain why three unit roots cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.09, whereas two unit roots with a p-value of only 0.05 can. For the choice of r = 1 the largest unrestricted root is 0.72, whereas for r = 2 it is 0.79. Furthermore, the …rst two cointegration relations look reasonably stationary as Figure 3 shows. The third cointegration relation, while not reported here, is clearly trending. For CVAR 2, the trace test suggests r = 2 (p-value 0.18). For this choice the largest characteristic root is 0.80 and the the …rst two cointegration relations look convincingly stationary. Because the rank test has been shown to be quite robust to moderate ARCH (Rahbek et. al, 2002) and excess kurtosis (Gonzalo, 1994), we consider the determination of cointegration rank more reliable in CVAR 2. While admitting that the choice of rank is less clear in CVAR 1, we continue with r = 2 in both models to improve comparability. Table 3 reports the cointegration results for both CVAR models where we have imposed one just-identifying restriction on each relation. In CVAR 1 the …rst relation has the properties of a Phelps modi…ed Phillips curve: The interest rate -unemployment relation where
Estimated cointegration relationships
The in ‡ation rate is equilibrium correcting indicating that unemployment in excess of u t = 1:8(b t p t ) + 5:5 would lead to a downward pressure on in ‡ation rate. The adjustment coe¢ cient -0.40 corresponds roughly to a mean adjustment time of 1.5 quarters. Unemployment is not signi…cantly correcting, but interest rates are reacting to deviations from the Phillips curve consistent with prior expectations. Figure 3 shows that the relation looks acceptable in terms of stationarity. The second relation suggests that the short-term interest rate has been positively co-moving with the long-term bond rate and negatively with the unemployment rate. As the interest rate spread (rather than unemployment) is signi…cantly equilibrium correcting to this relation, it is likely to capture features of a central bank reaction rule.
Thus, somewhat surprisingly, CVAR 1 provides fairly plausible estimates of a Phillips curve with the natural rate being a function of the real longterm interest rate. It has correctly signed coe¢ cients toward which in ‡ation rate is adjusting and elements of a central bank reaction rule. As the graph Test of Beta(t) = 'Know n Beta' 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 of the equilibrium errors in Figure 3 demonstrates, the deviations from (4) do not suggest fundamentally changing cointegration properties. While the second relation is slightly more volatile during the crisis period, it does not seem strikingly misspeci…ed.
This visual check of cointegration properties needs to be complemented with a formal test of parameter constancy. The recursive tests in Figure 4 , of parameter constancy of is based on testing the hypothesis~ sp( t 1 ) where~ is estimated for the subsample 1990:1-2010:1 and t 1 is recursively estimated starting from the baseline sample 1982:1-1986:1 and then recursively extending the sample period with t 1 = 1; 2; 3 until the full sample is covered. The test statistic is divided by the 95% quantile so parameter constancy is rejected on a 5% level when the graph is above the unit line. The X(t) graph corresponds to the full CVAR 2, whereas the R1(t) graph corresponds to the same model where 1 x has been concentrated out. The The unemployment interest rate relation recursive tests reject constancy of suggesting that the cointegration properties of the pre-crisis period are di¤erent from the ones in post-crisis period. Thus, the sample period is likely to de…ne at least two regimes. The CVAR 2 is speci…ed with an equilibrium mean shift in the cointegration relation. This shift is found strongly signi…cant based on 2 (2) = 24:03[0:00]. The two cointegration relations contain one just-identifying restriction each.
The …rst relation has the property of a Phillips curve relation with the natural rate being a function of the real interest rate, but the coe¢ cient to the unemployment rate is insigni…cant. Thus, allowing for an equilibrium mean shift seems to make the Phillips curve less visible in the data. In ‡ation is signi…cantly equilibrium correcting and the graph in Figure 5 suggests that the mean shift has been able to remove most of the persistent movements which were visible in CVAR 1.
The second relation is essentially describing a natural rate relation between unemployment rate and the real long-term bond rate and the long-Test of Beta(t) = 'Know n Beta' 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 short interest rates spread. The fact that the coe¢ cients to the bond rate and the spread are almost equal with opposite signs suggests, however, that it is the short-term interest rate rather than the long-term that have been important for the natural rate. The unemployment rate is signi…cantly adjusting to this relation as is the interest rate spread, albeit less signi…cantly so. The latter suggests that the second relation may also be interpreted as a monetary policy reaction rule and that lowering the short-term interest rate may have helped to reduce unemployment rate.
While the graphs of the cointegration relations do not signal misspeci…-cation, the recursive tests of constant in Figure 6 , suggest that the cointegration properties in the pre and post 1990 crisis period are not the same. Thus, allowing for an equilibrium mean shift in the cointegration relations does not seem su¢ cient to capture the changes between the two periods. The next section will ask whether the cointegration properties have changed in a way predicted by Koo (2010) .
Specifying the Phillips curve as a STR model
The above rejection of cointegration parameter constancy suggests that the Phelps Phillips curve relationship (3) has not been completely stable over the entire sample period. Such a change in cointegration properties might be a signal that the Phillips curve relationship changed after the Finnish real estate bubble burst and the economy moved into a balance sheet recession of the type hypothesized by Koo (2010) .
To test this hypothesis we adopt the smooth transition regression (STR) framework pioneered by Teräsvirta (1994) . More speci…cally, we follow the approach by Saikkonen and Choi (2004) which extends the STR framework to the case of stochastically trending regressors. In line with Koo (2010), we assume that there are two regimes: one describing normal periods during which a standard Phelps Phillips curve prevails and the other balance sheet recession periods in which the interest rate e¤ect is expected to be diluted. At any given point of time, the economy is assumed to move smoothly between these two states. This gives us a transition function of the logistic form with symmetric weights attached to the regimes around the half way point, i.e.:
and '( t ) = 1 1 + e 1 ( t 2 ) where x t is the vector of explanatory variables, i0 ; i1 are parameters in Regime i = 1; 2 respectively, t is the transition variable and S t contains three centered seasonal dummies. The e¤ect of x t varies between 11 in Regime 1 and 21 in Regime 2.
The main di¢ culty lies in …nding a suitable transition variable ( t ) that is able to capture periods in which the private sector experiences balance sheet problems. For this purpose, we adopt a measure provided by Juselius and Upper (2012) household sector disposable income. The reason why we focus on the household sector rather than the business sector, is because of the crucial role house prices played for the collapse of bubble and for the depth and length of the subsequent crisis. The transition variable, t ; depicted in Figure 7 , is designed to capture household sector leverage adjusted for movements in the value of the housing collateral. As long as house prices remain high, leverage is less of a problem but as prices fall the housing debt can exceed the value of the collateral aggravating the e¤ect of leverage.
The linear CVAR results suggested that there are two equilibrium relations in the data: one describing a relation between the unemployment rate and the real and nominal interest rates that could be interpreted as the gap between unemployment and its natural rate or alternatively as a monetary policy rule; the other describing a relation between in ‡ation rate and the unemployment gap. Accordingly we specify two STR models one for the unemployment rate and the other for the in ‡ation rate.
For equilibrium unemployment y t = u t , x 0 t = (u; p t ; b t ; s t ) , (b t Figure 8: Actual and …tted unemployment p t ; b t s t ; b t ) where the latter formulation is just a linear transformation of the original data. In addition we include a step dummy variable, D s;94;t , to allow for a permanent shift of the level unemployment rate in 1994:1, capturing a rise in long-term structural unemployment in the wake of the crisis.
The results for both models are reported in Table 4 . The model for unemployment provides clear evidence of a nonlinear regime shift of the smooth transition type. The estimated coe¢ cient of the speed of adjustment, 1 = 9:45, suggests that 90% of the transition takes place in the interval where 3:01 t 3:47, with the half way point estimated at 2 = 3:24. Interestingly, the latter corresponds exactly to the onset of the banking crisis in 1991:3. The zero coe¢ cients on the bond rate in the …rst regime and the real bond rate in the second regime were accepted with 2 (2) = 1:3[0:60]: Figure 7 shows that the crisis regime only comprises the three worst years of unemployment suggesting that they were truly anomalous years.
For the …rst regime, the estimated coe¢ cient of the long-term real interest rates is consistent with the Phelps hypothesis but with a rather small coe¢ cient. In the second regime the coe¢ cient of the spread is not statis- tically signi…cant and the bond rate is negative but signi…cant. Although the interpretation of the coe¢ cients is not straightforward, the results seem to con…rm the Koo hypothesis that the e¤ect of the interest rates changes completely during a balance sheet recession. Figure 8 reports the actual and …tted values from the unemployment STR model. While equilibrium unemployment closely follows actual unemployment, it is nonetheless systematically either under or overestimated for much of the period and the model su¤ers from strong residual autocorrelation. The signi…cance tests results should, therefore, only be considered indicative. Table 4 The estimated value for the speed of adjustment, 1 = 42:9, suggests that 90% of the transition takes place in the interval where 2:17 t 2:27, with the half way point estimated at 2 = 2:22. Interestingly, the latter value corresponds exactly to the burst of the housing bubble in 1990:1. Contrary to the unemployment rate, there is now much stronger evidence for a sharp shift between the two regimes and the second regime essentially continues for the rest of the sample period (see Figure 7) . Thus, there might have been a structural break in the determination of in ‡ation rate rather than a smooth transition of the STR-type. Figure 9 shows actual and …tted in ‡ation rates. It does not suggest any systematic deviations between the two which was con…rmed by standard misspeci…cation tests. In the …rst regime the short-term interest rate was insigni…cant, in the second regime this was the case with the long-term bond rate. They were jointly accepted based on 2 (2) = 4:3[0:12]: For the …rst regime the coe¢ -cient to the unemployment gap has the wrong sign, whereas for the second regime there are evidence in support of a Phelps Phillips curve relationship. Thus, the results seem to suggest that the …rst regime is a "non-normal" regime whereas the second regime seems more normal. This may not be too surprising: The …rst regime covers both a period of …nancial regulation, 1982-1985 and a period of …nancial deregulation, 1986-1990. The latter period is, however, far from normal in the sense that it was characterized by an accelerating housing bubble and an overheated economy.
While the results were not completely unambiguous, they can nonetheless be interpreted as broad empirical support for Phelps natural rate hypothesis and for Koo's hypothesis of a weakening interest rate e¤ect after the bursting of a real estate bubble. The results from the CVAR and STR analyses raise the question why the size of the coe¢ cients di¤ered so much. This and the question of a structral break in in ‡ation rate will be addressed in the next section.
Discussing the results
The CVAR results in Section 4 provided some broad support for a Phillips curve augmented with a Phelpsian natural rate relation, but they were to some extent challenged by the STR results. The latter suggested a much lower e¤ect of the real interest rate in the unemployment model and of the unemployment gap in the in ‡ation model. Furthermore, the STR in ‡ation model suggested that the end of the bubble de…ne a structural break rather than a smooth transition to a new regime. Accordingly, the CVAR needs to be re-estimated for the post-bubble period. The unemployment STR model showed that the period 1991:3-1995:1, comprising a period of extremely high unemployment rates, should be considered a di¤erent regime. But, while the in ‡ation model was statistically well speci…ed, the unemployment model showed strong evidence of autocorrelated residuals 5 casting doubts on the validity of the statistical inference in that model. Therefore, as a sensitivity check we re-estimated the unemployment STR model (5) allowing for a lagged unemployment rate:
where is a measure of unemployment persistence. Table 5 reports the results:
With this change in speci…cation, the autocorrelation test is now acceptable, as is the ARCH test, while normality is still rejected. It is quite interesting that the unemployment model now suggests two new regimes, one from 1982:2-1990:1, the other from 1990:2-2010:4. These are almost exactly coinciding with the previous in ‡ation rate regimes. Of course, this does not imply that the extreme unemployment years have become more "normal", only that the high autocorrelation coe¢ cient (0.95) makes it easier to explain the persistent movements in unemployment rate and, therefore, easier to detect other changes in the cointegration properties. Table 5 shows that the distinguishing feature between regime 1 and 2 is the way interest rates a¤ect unemployment. In regime 1 (characterized by capital deregulation, excessive spending, a fast developing real estate bubble and in ‡ationary expectations) the real long-term bond rate had an insigni…-cant e¤ect on unemployment and was set to zero, whereas the nominal rate 2 (2) = 19:1 had a negative and signi…cant e¤ect. Obviously, the demand for labor had kept increasing as the bubble kept in ‡ating in spite of increasing long-term and short-term interest rates. Similar behavior has seen in many of the more recent bubble economies. In regime 2 (characterized by very high unemployment rates, re-consolidation of balance sheets both in the private and business sector, and relatively low central bank interest rate) the real long-term bond rate is positively related to the unemployment rate, whereas both the spread and the nominal bond rate were found insigni…cant and set to zero. The steady-state solution gives a much higher coe¢ cient (2.2) to the real long-term bond rate. It is now much closer to the estimate in (4). Thus, the divergence between the CVAR and the STR natural rate results seemed to be due to missing unemployment dynamics in the STR model.
The new results suggest that the bubble period preceding the crisis was indeed exceptional: standard economic mechanisms did not seem to be at work at all. The euphoria of the bubble period stands in harsh contrast to the painful adjustment back to more sustainable conditions characterizing the second period where the results emphasize the strong relationship between the unemployment rate and the real long-term bond rate. The results provide strong support for the Phelps natural rate of unemployment theory.
7 In ‡ation, unemployment and interest rate dynamics in the period of credit deregulation
According to the STR results the second regime starts in 1990:1 and continues until the end of the sample in 2010:4. However, the CVAR results based on this sample were strongly in ‡uenced by the fact that the sample starts at a point when the economy is very far from equilibrium. We have addressed this problem by …rst estimating the CVAR for a sample that starts three years before the crisis erupted and then compare the results based on a sample that starts after the extreme unemployment years. The …rst model analysis is based on the assumption that the signi…cant change in the Finnish economy was due to the deregulation of credit, the second analysis is based on the STR results in Table 4 which suggested that the whole period up to 1995 was exceptional either for in ‡ation or unemployment. The upper part of Table 6 report the results for the period 1987:1-2010:4. Based on the trace test, the cointegration rank was found to be three rather than two in the full sample. The fact that the full sample was a mixture of a credit regulated and a deregulated period is likely to explain the di¤erence in cointegration rank.
The estimated cointegration relations together with the estimated adjustment coe¢ cients tell the following story of in ‡ation, unemployment, and interest rate dynamics in the period after credit regulation:
1. The …rst relation shows that in ‡ation rate and the interest rate spread have been positively co-moving over the sample period. In ‡ation has been equilibrium correcting and the real long-term bond rate has reacted positively to this relation.
2. The second relation shows that the unemployment rate and the real long-term bond rate have been positively co-moving describing a Phelpsian natural rate of unemployment. In ‡ation rate is negatively a¤ected by the unemployment gap consistent with a Phillips curve e¤ect, the unemployment rate is equilibrium correcting, and the real long-term bond rate is positively a¤ected by the gap.
3. The third relation has the property of a central bank policy rule: the long-short spread has been positively co-moving with the unemploy- ment rate and negatively with the in ‡ation rate. The spread is equilibrium correcting, in ‡ation has gone down when the spread relation has been above its steady-state level and so has unemployment rate, albeit not very signi…cantly so, whereas the real bond rate has gone up.
These are all economically plausible results which are broadly consistent with the STR results. The estimate of the unemployment gap e¤ect in the in ‡ation STR model was -0.14 and -0.19 in the CVAR. The estimate of the real bond rate e¤ect in the natural rate relation was 2.2 in the STR model and 1.2 in the CVAR.
For the second period the rank test again suggested three cointegration relations. The structure has one overidentifying restriction which was accepted based on 2 (1) = 0:05[0:82]: Together with the adjustment coe¢ cients they describe the following mechanisms:
1. The …rst relation shows that the interest rate spread can be considered a unit vector in the space spanned by for this period. It is autoregressive in itself and has a positive e¤ect on the real bond rate.
The second relation describes the Phelps unemployment gap relation
where the coe¢ cient to the real long-term bond rate in the natural rate relation is now somewhat higher than for the longer sample and closer to the STR results. Unemployment is equilibrium correcting. A positive unemployment gap has a negative e¤ect on in ‡ation consistent with a Phillips curve e¤ect, but with a borderline signi…cant adjustment coe¢ cient. The real bond rate is positively a¤ected by the unemployment gap.
3. The third relation has the property of a central bank policy rule describing the spread as a positive function of unemployment rate and a negative function of in ‡ation. It resembles the third relation of the longer period but the size of the coe¢ cients has increased. This may suggest that the central bank has reacted more strongly to unemployment and in ‡ation when the worst of the crisis is over. The spread is equilibrium correcting. Unemployment is positively a¤ected when the spread is above its steady-state value, whereas in ‡ation rate is not signi…cantly a¤ected.
Qualitatively the results are similar for the two periods. The largest di¤erence is associated with the implied monetary policy rule and its e¤ect on the system. In the post credit deregulation period, which includes the crisis years, unemployment is not signi…cantly reacting to changes in the policy rule, whereas in ‡ation is. In the second period, which does not include the worst crisis years, unemployment rate is again signi…cantly reacting to the central bank policy rule, whereas in ‡ation rate is not. This can be interpreted as some evidence of a Koo e¤ect: In a period of balance sheet re-consolidation, economic activity is likely to be low independently of the level of the central bank interest rate.
Concluding discussion
Finland experienced a real estate bubble almost two decades before the more recent US real estate bubble burst in 2007 followed by a large number of other similar cases around the world. Can we learn anything useful from the Finnish experience? Even though this paper focuses only on a small part of the ongoing policy debate, it is the relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment that is crucial for a balanced mix between …scal and monetary policy. With the caveat that some of the conclusions may not be robust to expanding the information set, we believe our results may help to shed light on in ‡ation, unemployment and interest rate dynamics in the period after the abolishment of most of previous restrictions on credit and capital.
Our approach was …rst to learn about the basic mechanisms based on a linear CVAR. Provided the correct mechanism is non-linear, the CVAR approach will of course only deliver average e¤ects over the sample period. While it is hard to know a priori whether such results make economic sense, the …rst CVAR results turned out to be quite good: the estimates of the constant and the real interest rate e¤ect in the natural unemployment rate relationship were plausible; in ‡ation and the natural rate gap were negatively related, and the adjustment took place in the in ‡ation rate equation as expected. Nevertheless, there were quite large di¤erences between the estimates from the linear CVAR and the two-regime STR models for unemployment and in ‡ation, respectively.
The STR results also showed that the bursting of the bubble de…ned a structural break for in ‡ation rate rather than just a regime shift. When the STR model for the unemployment rate was respeci…ed by including lagged unemployment, the results suggested a similar regime shift at the time when the bubble burst. This turned out to be the reason why the CVAR and the STR results di¤ered so much: the CVAR estimates were basically average effects from two di¤erent structural regimes. As the most signi…cant structural change in this period is likely to be associated with a major deregulation of credit and capital movements in 1986, the CVAR was re-estimated for the period characterized by credit deregulation. The new results from the CVAR and the STR models became now much more aligned to each other.
By combining the CVAR and STR analyses the paper was able to provide a plausible description of the dynamics of in ‡ation, unemployment and interest rates in an econometrically and economically very di¢ cult and demanding period. We found that (1) in ‡ation and the interest rate spread was co-moving, describing a relation between actual and expected in ‡ation, (2) unemployment and the real long-term bond rate were positively co-moving, describing a Phelpsian natural unemployment rate, and (3) the short-term interest rate relative to the long-term bond rate was negatively co-moving with unemployment rate and positively with the in ‡ation rate, describing elements of a Taylor type monetary policy rule. The adjustment dynamics were generally plausible and interpretable.
Altogether, the results provide empirical support both for the Phelps Phillips curve with the natural rate being a function of the long-term real interest rate, for the Frydman and Goldberg IKE hypothesis of pronounced persistence of the real interest rate and the interest rate spread as a result of …nancial speculation, and for the Koo hypothesis of the weakening e¤ect of central bank interest rates for economic activity in a balance sheet recession.
Interestingly the results also suggested that CPI in ‡ation, contrary to unemployment, has not reacted in any signi…cant way to changes in the central bank policy rule. One interpretation is that the determination of consumer price in ‡ation after …nancial deregulation has been more strongly a¤ected by the pressure to be internationally competitive rather than by excess domestic demand. This would be consistent with the hypothesis in Section 2 that in an IKE world where …nancial speculation drive the nominal exchange rates away from their fundamental values, enterprises are forced to use a pricing to market strategy to preserve market shares. In such a world, CPI in ‡ation is likely to be determined in a Phelpsian customer market in which labor productivity and pro…t shares are adjusting much more than prices. The fact that unemployment but not CPI in ‡ation was shown to react strongly to the estimated gaps in the model supports such an interpretation.
Taken together, the results suggest that an adequate empirical understanding of in ‡ation, unemployment and interest rate dynamics in a world
